

REMARKS

At the time of the Office Action dated September 5, 2006, claims 1-16 were pending and rejected in this application.

On page 2 of the Office Action, the Examiner asserted that the Title of the invention is not descriptive. Applicants disagree. However, Applicants would be receptive to an alternative Title should the Examiner recommend one.

CLAIM 1 IS REJECTED UNDER THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF 35 U.S.C. § 112

On page 2 of the Office Action, the Examiner identified perceived an informality generating an antecedent basis issue with regard to claim 1. This rejection is respectfully traversed.

The Examiner asserted that the limitation "device interface logic" lacks sufficient antecedent basis. In this regard, Applicants note that "logic" is a plural noun, and thus, does not require an "a," before the term. Therefore, Applicants respectfully submit that the imposed rejection of claim 1 under the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 has been overcome and, hence, Applicants respectfully solicit withdrawal thereof.

**CLAIMS 1-16 ARE REJECTED UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103 FOR OBVIOUSNESS BASED UPON
YAMADA ET AL., U.S. PATENT PUBLICATION NO. 2002/0032786 (HEREINAFTER YAMADA), IN
VIEW OF COULSON ET AL., U.S. PATENT PUBLICATION NO. 2002/0083264 (HEREINAFTER
COULSON)**

On pages 2-5 of the Office Action, the Examiner concluded that one having ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Yamada in view of Coulson to arrive at the claimed invention. This rejection is respectfully traversed.

Claim 1

On page 3 of the Office Action, the Examiner stated the following with regard to the primary reference of Yamada and the asserted motivation to combine:

Yamada does not teach a device selector disposed in said reflector and map.
However, Coulson teaches a mass storage system, selects and maps mass stored data (see page 2 paragraph 0021 and fig.2). Both Yamada and Coulson teach storage and connecting with computer, then it would have been to an artisan of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention was made to select data and map in order to downloaded from the computer or remote network, as taught by Coulson, in order to the size of data interface, so that resource and power is minimized.

Applicants note that the Examiner's statement of the rejection suffers from several deficiencies. Specifically, the Examiner has failed to properly identify all the differences between the primary reference of Yamada and the claim invention, as recited in claim 1. The Examiner has also failed to specifically identify the features within Coulson being relied upon in the rejection. Moreover, the Examiner's rationale for combining Coulson and Yamada lacks a logical coherency.

Not only does Yamada fail to teach the claimed device selector, Yamada also fails to teach the claimed device interface logic. The feature (i.e., USB interface 8) relied upon by the

Examiner to teach this limitation is described by Yamada as just an interface. Although Yamada also teaches that the terminal device 2 includes a microprocessor 6, paragraph [0035] of Yamada just states that the "microprocessor 6 operates in accordance with a program stored in a built-in program memory to control the USB interface 8 and the transceiver circuit 10," which is not comparable to the claimed device interface logic, which recites that the device interface logic is "programmed to map mass storage in said personal computing device as specified by said device selector to a shared resource over a wireless network established through said wireless data transceiver." None of these limitations are also disclosed by Yamada.

As to the Examiner's secondary reference, the Examiner only cited Fig. 2 and paragraph [0021] of Coulson. In this regard, Applicants submit that the Examiner has failed to clearly designate the teachings in Coulson being relied upon the statement of the rejection. Thus, the Examiner's rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 fails to comply with 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(c).¹

Figure 2 is described as "a partial block diagram of an address space for a hybrid mass storage device." How the teachings in Coulson, in general, and specifically in Figure 2 and paragraph [0021] of Coulson, relate to a device connectable to a personal computing device using a plug-and-play adapter is entirely unclear. Upon reviewing the teachings of Coulson, it appears that the hybrid mass storage system 130 is intended to be an integral part of the computer system 100 (see paragraph [0018]). The concept of mapping address spaces to

¹ 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(c) provides:

In rejecting claims for want of novelty or for obviousness, the examiner must cite the best references at his or her command. When a reference is complex or shows or describes inventions other than that claimed by the applicant, the particular part relied on must be designated as nearly as practicable. The pertinence of each reference, if not apparent, must be clearly explained and each rejected claim specified.

locations in a memory device (e.g., non-volatile storage array 135 or hard disk storage medium 133) described by Coulson is ubiquitous within the prior art, and only marginally related to the specific limitations not disclosed by Yamada.

As to the Examiner's asserted benefit of the modification (i.e., "in order to the size of data interface, so that resource and power is minimized), not only has the Examiner apparently omitted a word between the words "order to" and "the size," the Examiner has failed to factually establish where this asserted benefit can be found in the applied prior art. Also, the Examiner has failed to establish any nexus between the missing limitations and the asserted benefit. For example, Applicants are entirely unclear as to how Coulson describes, by modifying Yamada, that the "resource and power is minimized" through the use of the claimed device interface logic and device selector. Moreover, upon reviewing paragraph [0021] of Coulson, Applicants are entirely unclear as to how the teachings found therein would provide the Examiner's asserted benefit.

Claim 6

Upon reviewing the statement of the rejection, Applicants are unable to find any mention of independent claim 6.

Claims 9 and 13

Applicants incorporate herein the arguments previously presented with regard to independent claim 1 as also applying to independent claims 9 and 13. The Examiner has failed to properly characterize the differences between the primary reference of Yamada and the claimed

invention. Moreover, the Examiner has failed to specifically point out within Coulson the features being relied upon in the statement of the rejection per the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(c). In addition, not only does Coulson fail to teach the claimed limitations not disclosed by Yamada, the Examiner's rationale for modifying Yamada in view of Coulson lacks a logical coherency.

Therefore, for the reasons stated above, Applicants respectfully submit that the Examiner has failed to establish a prima facie case of obviousness in rejecting claims 1-16. Thus, Applicants solicit withdrawal of the imposed rejection of claims 1-16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 for obviousness based upon Yamada in view of Coulson.

Applicants have made every effort to present claims which distinguish over the prior art, and it is believed that all claims are in condition for allowance. However, Applicants invite the Examiner to call the undersigned if it is believed that a telephonic interview would expedite the prosecution of the application to an allowance. Accordingly, and in view of the foregoing remarks, Applicants hereby respectfully request reconsideration and prompt allowance of the pending claims.

Although Applicants believe that all claims are in condition for allowance, the Examiner is directed to the following statement found in M.P.E.P. § 706(II):

When an application discloses patentable subject matter and it is apparent from the claims and the applicant's arguments that the claims are intended to be directed to such patentable subject matter, but the claims in their present form cannot be allowed because of defects in form or omission of a limitation, the examiner should not stop with a bare objection or rejection of the claims. The examiner's action should be constructive in nature and when possible should offer a definite suggestion for correction.

Application No.: 10/675,507

To the extent necessary, a petition for an extension of time under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136 is hereby made. Please charge any shortage in fees due in connection with the filing of this paper, including extension of time fees, to Deposit Account 09-0461, and please credit any excess fees to such deposit account.

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Respectfully submitted,

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